The paper investigates the mechanics through which novel technological principles are developed and diused throughout an economy consisting of a technologically heterogeneous ensemble of rms. In the model entrepreneurs invest in the discovery and in the diusion of a technological principle and their prot ow depends on how many rms adopt the innovation and on how long it takes other entrepreneurs to improve it. We show that technological convergence emerges from the competition among entrepreneurs for the prot ow and characterize the economy's growth rate.
Introduction
Technological diusion is a crucial factor in fostering productivity growth. It is worth noting, however, that this process is not merely the replication and imitation of known and well established techniques, although this may be a substantial part of the whole, but is characterized by a sequence of innovations through which the technology is spread across dierent rms belonging to dierent production sectors.
Whilst the most radical form taken by this process is the diusion of a general purpose technology (see for example the discussion in David, 1991; Helpman and Trajtenberg, 1998; Helpman, 1998; Rosenberg, 1976 Rosenberg, , 1982 Rosenberg and Trajtenberg, 2004) , it also involves the piecemeal adaptation of new artifacts to dierent usages and productive purposes. In any case, it clearly hinges on knowledge and information transmission. As early as 1958, March and Simon (1958) , in a seminal contribution concerning the functioning of organizations, held that much innovation results from borrowed knowledge, that is from knowledge rstly developed in other rms or in other industries. More recently, this important theme has been further investigated by the work of Cohen and Levinthal (1989 Levinthal ( , 1990 ). Their case is based on the well tested argument that new knowledge is strongly dependent on previously accumulated knowledge. Furthermore, these authors argue that rms that carry out and invest in R&D are capable of adapting knowledge originating in other rms. This is clearly a process that accounts for much diusion and ultimately for technological convergence.
1
The purpose of this paper is to characterize the growth rate of an economy featuring a high degree of heterogeneity both in terms of output variety and of the technologies that are accordingly employed and to investigate the mechanics through which a single technological principle is introduced throughout the whole economy. We show that entrepreneurs' investments, aimed at discovering a technological principle and diusing it throughout the economy, together with the competition among entrepreneurs for the prot ow leads to the emergence of technological convergence. Proximity in our model is dened in terms of technological distance. Although much literature has dealt with geographical networks and clustering, consider for example the rich spate of contributions on industrial districts, we take the view that in light of the new means provided by information technologies what matters most for innovation diusion is technological rather than geographical proximity 2 required. Historical evidence has in fact indicated that the eective diusion of a new technological principle has often required enabling and essential complementary innovations (Goldfarb 2005 ). We envisage a clustering principle responding to a criterion of technological proximity shaped by the inherent problems they face, the corresponding skills and expertise they possess. The economy that results from this view of rm heterogeneity is an ensemble of clusters that dier in terms of their technological prole, each collecting rms that produce dierent things but that are technologically alike. Within each cluster, rms are still heterogeneous in terms of their performance and the goods they produce but exhibit a high degree of technological likeness. It is important to stress that the proximity of technological clusters is not dened at the beginning of the process but depends on the evolution of the technology.
We distinguish two types of investments. Investment aimed at the discovery of the technological principle and investment aimed at diusion throughout the economy. While the rst in quite standard, the second one is the upshot of the assumption that rms employ heterogeneous technologies and hence diusion implies that the original innovation must be adapted to the specic needs of a new user, even in the case of technological proximity. We assume that investments in within-cluster diusion gives rise to a learning-by-doing principle, that may lead to ideas and opportunities to introduce the technological principle into rms belonging to other technological clusters 2 . In other words, it is conjectured that technological opportunities to successfully nd applications in distant clusters emerge as a consequence of innovative investment that leads, on the one hand, to score success within clusters and, on the other, as a consequence of learning, generates technological opportunities to cross over to other clusters. The learning-to adapt process lays the ground for a success breeds success feedback but it is a necessary condition not a sucient one. Leaping across technological barriers is an eort of a very challenging nature and quite distinct from that required to within-cluster diusion.
Our paper is related to Silverberg and Verspagen (2005) where technological trajectories and innovation dynamics are studied in a model of percolation in a complex technology space and Arenas et al. with local interaction among heterogeneous rms the conditions for the emergence of technological convergence. While in these papers the set of technological neighbors is exogenously dened, in this 2 Investment in the diusion within a technology cluster may also lead to a reduction of costs as a consequence of a learning-by-doing eect. Hence, the greater the number of within-cluster adoptions the lower the costs and therefore the greater the likelihood of introducing the technological principle in other clusters. one technological proximity is endogenously determined, depending on the characteristics and the unfolding of the technology development process. Moreover, we show that technological convergence is the result of investment in technology diusion and the competition among entrepreneurs for the prot ow.
The remaining part of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss the innovation process.
In particular, we describe technological clusters, the process of within-and between-cluster diusion, the time and space dimension of the innovator's prot ow and determine the innovator's incentive to invest in the discovery and in the diusion of the technological principle. In Section 3 we characterize the resulting emergent properties of the diusion process and the features of economic growth. In Section 4 we generalize the model by considering the diusion of heterogeneous technological principles and the competition among an endogenously determined number of entrepreneurs that invest in R&D.
Section 5 draws some conclusions.
The innovation process
The economy we wish to deal with is composed of J nal goods each of which is produced by a rm with a specic technique and monopoly power. We consider an R&D race of vertical non-drastic innovations where the successful innovator replaces the incumbent. In particular, we distinguish two innovation processes: the discovery of a novel technological principle and its diusion throughout the economy.
Both are ultimately chance events the key of which is the investment that the innovating entrepreneur is willing to devote to these tasks and they are accordingly modeled by a probability structure that depends on investment. We start by considering the eorts of just one innovator discussing later the competition that arises thanks to a sequence of further competing productivity increasing innovations.
As a matter of reference and for simplicity's sake, the economy we discuss can be viewed as one in which there is a representative consumer with the following utility function:
ln (x j ) (1) where x j denotes the quantity of good h bought. Normalizing the consumer's income to one, from the optimal consumption choice ζ j x j = 1, where ζ j is the price of product j.
We rst start describing the diusion process and afterward we discuss the discovery of the novel technological principle.
Technological clusters and diusion
It is expedient to group the J nal goods according to their technological proximity in order to form clusters of technological neighbors. These clusters are to be understood as ensembles of nal goods that employ similar techniques. Within each, the goods that compose them are not homogeneous, they are all produced by specic processes but the dierence in terms of the technological principles employed across clusters is far greater than within each. As stated in the introduction, the diusion of a technological principle is a matter of innovative adaptation within a cluster and a matter of innovative application across clusters. The distance separating the latter is accordingly not apriorily known but depends on the improvement and development of the technological principle that is capable of achieving a cross-over linking clusters that may not have any beforehand likeness. There may, therefore, be innovations that prove easily introducible whilst others do not; some innovations that diuse speedily in some clusters but do not in others or nd barriers forbidding any diusion.
A technologically connected network is the result of the process, not its prerequisite. For the sake of simplicity we assume that each cluster is composed of N goods, the whole economy to be a set of J N clusters and consider the limit J → ∞ with a nite number of goods N in each.
Within-cluster diusion
Innovations lead to non-drastic productivity increases of size γ > 1. Let κ be the marginal production cost of an incumbent rm, then the marginal production costs of an outsider rm adopting the innovation are γ −1 κ. Because of competition between the insider and the outsider, the price charged by rm h adopting the technology is ζ h = κ and rm prots are
where θ°≡ 1 − γ −1 and where c h are xed costs (per unit time) of the new technology. Successful implementation of the original technological principle depends thus on the size of the xed costs. We designate by I the investment expenditure aimed at reducing them. We assume that for each nal good producer h, xed costs c h , h = 1, 2, ..., J, are i.i.d. random variables that take the value θ < θ°with probability p (I) and θ > θ°with probability 1 − p (I), where we assume that p (I) is an increasing and concave function of I, with p (I) > 0 for each I < ∞. Adoptions occur as long as θ°≥ c h , it then follows that the mean number of adoptions isn (I) = N p (I), wheren (I) is also increasing and concave in I. We dene θ = θ°− θ .
Between-cluster diusion: the role of investment and diusivity
Every economic system lends itself in varying degrees to the diusion of new technological principles.
It is its structure, the degree of development and its technological capabilities that set the framework enabling an innovation to diuse. We term this feature of the diusion process diusivity and represent it by a single parameter d. The innovating entrepreneur will consider investment as a tool to maximize prots. I plays a double role generating, on the one hand, adoptions of innovations within a cluster and, on the other, through the eect of learning by adopting, increasing the mean number of new clusters that the innovator expects to reach. In this sense, it is a case of success breeds success.
3 A more realistic hypothesis is to assume that diusivity varies from cluster to cluster and is not a priori-ly known to the innovator. In this case, it can be assumed that diusivities are i.i.d. random variables of which the innovator may only conjecture the cumulative distribution function G(d, a), smooth and decreasing in a, where a is a measure of diusivity intensity: a property of the technological state of the economy which can be taken as known by the innovator. In this
and under appropriate assumptions about concavity, qualitative results found below still hold.
4 Assumption 1 is the natural consequence of the fact that the expected number of adopters within the cluster is increasing with respect to investment and that success breeds success. In the Appendix we restate Assumption 1 providing conditions such that µ(I, d) be a concave increasing function with respect to I and d. 6 
Investment and the diusion of innovations
The innovator's prot ow has two dimensions: one in time and one in space. The prot ow stemming from a single adoption continues until a new technological principle is successfully introduced by an entrant which thereby ousts the current incumbent. This event occurs with probability λ (over a unit time period) and clearly depends on the joint probabilities that a new seeding technological principle appears and that it diuses originating adoptions and applications both within and across clusters.
The size of the innovator's prot ow depends also on the number of within and between cluster adaptations. λ will later be fully and consistently endogenously characterized.
Let r be the long-term risk-neutral interest rate that denes the macroeconomic environment and which can be interpreted as the nancial cost to be borne when investment is undertaken.
5
Expected prots from the introduction of an innovation within a cluster are then π (I, λ) =
which is a strictly increasing and concave function of I.
The diusion process between clusters can be viewed as a branching process. Prots that the innovator expects to gain once step s of the diusion process has been reached depend both on the within-cluster expected prots and on the expected prots that can be made by reaching out to clusters one step further, the s+1-th: the former are given by π (I, λ) and let the latter be designated by V s+1 . Note that expected prots in a given cluster do not depend on s. The innovator's problem is then to establish the amount of investment that determines the distribution of xed production costs, and hence the number of adoptions within a cluster, and the expected number of new clusters that are likely to be reached.
How far an innovation can penetrate into complex, heterogeneous economies does not solely depend on their structural characteristics. Highly industry-specic technologies are less likely to pass across clusters and, therefore, the time it takes for an adoption transfer to be achieved can be assumed to be lengthier than in the case of technologies that are intrinsically easier to adapt. In this sense, an innovator must take into account the implied diusion time span and discount the probability of successfully bridging any two given clusters. Let τ be this expected time, we denote then with ρ = e −rτ the related discount factor. The slower is the technology likely to diuse on account of its intrinsic characteristics, the larger τ and hence the lower the discount factor ρ.
5 Assuming that consumers face an intertemporal consumption choice problem with utility functioń ∞ Denoting by V s the value of the innovation at the s-th step, the innovator's problem can be framed as:
which recursively denes the value of an innovation. The rst term in curly brackets represents expected prots within a given technology cluster, while the second term describes expected discounted prots from diusing the innovation to other technology clusters. Both terms depend on investment since the latter reduces the probability of high xed costs within a cluster thereby increasing the probability of within-cluster adoptions and, because of learning-by-doing, it opens up new avenues for adaptions into technologically distant clusters.
To insure that a unique solution to this problem exists, we must assume the following. 
where
A sucient condition for the existence of a unique solution for (6) is that the function ψ in (7) is a contraction with respect to V . Using the envelope theorem
from which the following sucient condition for the existence of a solution to (4) is obtained:
In the following we assume that parameters ρ and d are such that this condition is always satised and that θ is suciently large such that V is always positive.
Let V * = V (ρ, d, λ) be the solution of (6) Because of the second order condition Θ I < 0 and applying the implicit function theorem we obtain
Whilst the rst two partial derivatives are quite straightforward to interpret, the third is a reminder that the innovation value decreases when the probability of new innovations emerging as a result of entrants' success increases. The partial derivatives with respect to investment help to shed light on the role of the diusivity parameters, d and ρ. As it is to be expected, the higher is d, that is, the proner is the economy to diusion on account of its inner technological characteristics, the larger is investment. This is, of course, due to the positive impact on prots that can be expected by exploiting the innovative principle in a favorable technological context. The lower is τ , that is, the higher is ρ, the easier it is for a technology to bridge heterogeneous technology clusters, due to the positive impact on the value of innovation, the larger the investment. The larger is the probability of success of a new entrant (λ), the lower is the value of an innovation since entrepreneurs expect to prot from it for a shorter time span, and thus the lower the investment in within and between cluster adaptations.
The discovery of the technological principle
If any diusion is to occur in this economy a seed innovation must appear. As in the case discussed above, those who partake in the race to innovate stand a chance of success that must be grounded on the amount of initial investment that they are willing to undertake for this very purpose. Within and across cluster diusion depends upon this initial successful event as well as on the specic investment intended to support it. It is accordingly envisaged that such an initial innovation occurs according to a Poisson arrival rate that depends on the intensity of investment specically intended to research and initially develop.
Let such a function be dened by φ(H), with the usual properties φ > 0 and φ < 0, H being the investment magnitude. Furthermore, making an innovation market ready and potentially applicable to a production process requires a further sunk cost, for instance the making of a prototype, the denition of an operative book of blueprints, etc. Let this cost be designated by F . This is the crucial rst step in the chain of events likely to lead to productivity growth and to the eventual establishment of a true and generalized technological paradigm. It is, however, important to note that this investment expenditure and the activity it supports are to be distinguished from those that are conducive to learning-to-adapt and thus to within and between cluster diusion. The incentive to engage in this groundwork activity is precisely the value of the innovation and it is accordingly assumed that the magnitude of investment H results from the following maximum problem:
is the solution of (6), the rst order condition yields H * (ρ, d, λ) and consequently φ (ρ, d, λ) is the probability that a new technological principle is discovered. Using Lemma 1, the concavity assumption of φ and the implicit function theorem it can be shown that H * is increasing in ρ and d and decreasing in λ. We assume that F is suciently low such that Π > 0.
Innovation diusion and economic growth
Whilst ρ, d, are parameters that pertain, the former, specically to the type of the new technology, the latter to the economy's structure, λ is endogenously determined since it is the arrival rate of an innovation applied to a single nal good. This event is generated by an entrant that if successful can terminate the incumbent's ow of prots. As such, it is an arrival rate that is jointly determined by two components: the probability of a seed innovation φ(H) and the probability that an innovation be adopted in the production of a single good. The latter can be derived from the expected number of adoptions, that is by the expected number of rms that adopt over the total number of rms, J. This magnitude can, in turn, be computed by considering the average number of adopters in each cluster multiplied by the expected number of clusters that the innovation is likely to reach. As shown above, the former is p(ρ, d, λ)N while the latter can be obtained recursively. The average number of clusters reached at stage s given that z s−1 have been reached at stage s − 1 is:
Summing over all the possible stages G, dividing by J and taking into account that the average number of within-cluster adoptions is p(ρ, d, λ)N , the probability that the innovation reaches a particular nal good is p(ρ, d, λ)
the expected proportion of all clusters that are likely to be reached.
Since the economy considered is very large, in the limit J → ∞, we can consistently take the limit
It is immediate to see that it depends on µ(ρ, d, λ) ≷ 1. If it is smaller than 1, then branching is very short, the number of clusters reached is scant and the share of rms that are likely to adopt vanishing small for J that tends to innity: the limit is accordingly zero; if on the other hand, it is greater than 1, then there exists a positive and nite limit:
, which is the proportion of clusters likely to be reached by the technological principle, is also the survival probability of the branching process. If µ (ρ, d, λ) < 1 then such a proportion is negligibly small and the branching process dies out with certainty; if µ (ρ, d, λ) > 1, then ∆ is positive; equivalently, ∆ is the probability that all clusters be reached.
On the strength of this result, a solution, λ * can consistently be obtained by solving the xed point
Note that on account of the concavity of functions µ and p and since 
The corresponding economy's growth rate is proving that λ = 0 is not an equilibrium solution.
To clarify this point, consider the following extreme case. For r → 0, implying an inexhaustible source of nancial support, and suppose that λ = 0, implying full monopoly power enjoyed by the innovator, marginal gains from investments diverge to innity. As a consequence, the amount invested in the diusion of the technological principle by the innovator will be innitely large and thus the average number of clusters reached cannot be lower than 1, implying that λ = 0 cannot be an equilibrium.
Therefore, for suciently low r the unique equilibrium outcome is λ * > 0 with µ > 1 where the technological principle is expected to be introduced in a fraction ∆ (ρ, d, λ * ) of all clusters and in a
It is the competition among innovators for prot ows that leads to this result. The historical record does show that the great innovation waves (the railroads, electricity, the microchip and internet) have all taken place at at time of plentiful nance and low real interest rates.
An increase in the technology-specic (ρ) and and in the economy-specic diusivity rate (d) increases the investment in the discovery of the technology principle and in its diusion within and between technology clusters thereby increasing the economy's growth rate.
A more general case
We generalize the previous analysis in two ways. Firstly, we relax the assumption that all technologies are identical, and consider the case where some technologies are more easily propagated than others.
Secondly, we consider the case where the number of innovators investing in the discovery and diusion of technological principles is endogenously determined.
Heterogeneous technological principles
In the previous section any seed technology and its related technological principle appearing with probability φ(H * ) bear a time horizon measured by τ consequently dening a technology-specic discount factor. This assumption can be relaxed at no great cost by recognizing that innovations appear stochastically: they can be assumed to be drawn from a distribution reecting the relative diculty of each to be adaptable and transferable across heterogeneous goods. Simplifying somewhat the problem, the idea can be retained that some technologies are intrinsically more dicult to adopt by other sectors The would-be innovator at the moment of investing in the discovery of the technological principle does not know the type of technology that will be discovered, but knows the probability distribution
where P r (τ = τ m ) = q m and M m=1 q m = 1. We indicate with Q > Q the probability distribution Q that rst order stochastically dominates Q.
As a consequence, for each λ it is possible to nd the critical technology that separates those technologies that have economy-wide impacts from those that have vanishing small ones. More formally, a critical technology m * , if it exists, is dened as
where m * (and ρ * m ) are increasing in λ and decreasing in d. Thus, it is only for technologies above m * that diusion across sectors is likely to be sustained leading to economy-wide eects. If this critical technology does not exist then we set m * = ∞ and hence µ(d, λ) is always smaller than 1.
Once the technological principle has been discovered, the innovator solves problem (4) and thus for a given ρ m and λ the value of the innovation of type m can be determined V (ρ m , d, λ). In this case we also assume that θ is suciently large such that V is always positive and ρ m and d are suciently small such that ψ (V, ρ m , d, λ) is a contraction for each m = 1, ..., M .
The innovator's problem to conjure up a seed innovation can now be set as:
Taking the limit for J → ∞
Let Γ be the number of competing innovators, then in the limit for J → ∞ the probability λ of being ousted from the production of a single nal good solves the following xed point problem:
Proposition 2 If r is suciently small then the solution to the xed point problem (11) is λ * > 0 that solves
The economy's growth rate is
where technologies m ≥ m * The interpretation of these results is very similar to the ones in Proposition 1.
Competing innovators and endogenous entry
The number of competing innovators can then be made endogenous by introducing a free-entry condition. In this case, the probability of a seed innovation appearing is itself a function of the number of innovators just as is the expected value of an innovation. We assume that as long as the expected return from the investment in the discovery of the technology principle is positive, innovators enter the race to snatch a prot ow away from incumbent monopolists by paying the involved sunk cost F . Let us assume that r is suciently small such that from Proposition 2 the arrival rate of a technological principle is φ (H * (d, Γ)) and the value of the innovation of type m is V (d, ρ m , Γ, Q)
For simplicity's sake we neglect the integer problem and assume that Γ is real-valued. Hence, at the equilibrium condition (13) is satised with the equality sign. Resorting to the envelope theorem it can be concluded that since V (d, ρ m , Γ) is strictly decreasing in Γ 6 , the left-hand side of this equation is strictly decreasing in Γ insuring that a solution Γ * = Γ (d, Q) exists. A larger diusivity d and a Q > Q increase the entrepreneur's expected prots ow but they also increase the probability of being ousted by a subsequent innovator; the overall eect of d and Q on entry is therefore ambiguous.
Given the distribution of the M possible seed innovations and related technological principles, and
, it is then possible to identify the technology m * such that
Proposition 3 For suciently low values of r, λ * is given by (12), Γ * is determined by the free entry condition (13) and the economy's growth rate is given by
If d and Q have a positive eect on entry then g is increasing in d and
Proof of Proposition 3.
If d and Q have a positive eect on entry then λ
for Q > Q and the result stated in the Proposition follows.
Proposition 3 describes the growth rate of an economy where entrepreneurs invest in the discovery and the diusion of innovations throughout the economy and the equilibrium number of entrepreneurs is determined endogenously through a free entry condition.
Conclusions
In this paper we have shown that technological convergence, that is, the process of diusion of an original innovative principle across a heterogeneous economy, emerges as a result of the dynamic interplay between competition among entrepreneurs' for prot ows and entrepreneurial investment decisions. In particular, we have argued that diusion rests on investment aimed at introducing and adapting a seed innovation into a cluster of rms sharing a degree of technological similarity. As a consequence of this initial eort a process of learning-to-adapt is likely to arise cumulating sucient expertise to enable the original principle to cross-over to technologically distant clusters. Investment, therefore, lays the ground for success to breed more success. Diusion is thus modeled as a branching process and the condition for its survival has been identied. It has, accordingly, been shown that below a precisely dened threshold in terms of the expected number of clusters that at each step are likely to be reached the process dies out while above, it stands a positive probability of diusing over a signicant part of the whole economy. Investment to entice diusion through learning-toadapt as well as to conjure up the original seed innovation is determined as a result of innovators attempting to maximize their innovation value. The framework within which diusion unfolds is shaped as a monopolist-incumbent, innovation-searching entrant confrontation. This generates an equilibrium between the incentive to invest and the probability of an innovation being introduced. This probability has, in turn, been endogenously determined as a function of the probability of diusion to penetrate the whole economy. We have shown that the entrepreneur's investment in the diusion of the technological principle together with the competition among entrepreneurs for prots ows sets the economy in a state where technological convergence occurs and general purpose technologies emerge with a positive probability characterizing the economy's growth rate.
Appendix
Generalization of Assumption 1.
Lemma 2 Assume that the number k of clusters that are reachable be a random variable, the cumulative distribution function of which, F (k, n, d), depends on the the number n of adoptions within the cluster, on the diusivity parameter d and is convex and decreasing with respect to both variables. It, then, follows that mean number µ(I, d) is a concave increasing function with respect to I and d.
Assume that F (K, n, d) = 1.
Proof. The mean value of the number k of reachable new clusters, conditional on the number n of innovations, is
which is an increasing concave function of n and d.
On the other hand, by lemma 2 the probability mass function of the random variable n is pr(n = j) = 
I.
The second derivative can be analogously calculated (N − j) (E(k|j + 1) − E(k|j))
Again by the the properties of function (14), the right hand side of (16) is negative: hence µ is concave in I.
The proof of the properties of µ(I, d) as a function of d can be proved along the same lines.
